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I. ADMINIS RATIVE DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL
The expansion of administrative agencies in the government
during this century has resulted in the development of a body of
administrative law which primarily relates to the various adjudicating and rule making agencies. The Administrative Procedure Act
affects most of these agencies but does not encompass most of the administrative processes in the Department of Defense. Nevertheless
there have developed in the Department, both through intra-departmental rulings and judicial decisions, certain principles relating to administrative due process. While there is a plethora of writing on
administrative law and administrative due process in general, there
seems to be a dearth of articles on administrative due process in
military administrative procedures. "Administrative due process" as
herein considered is the constitutional concept of due process of law
applied to administrative actions.
It is characterized as the due process required in every administrative proceeding or other action which might result in the deprivation
of individual life, liberty or property. It is therefore not limited, nor
does the fifth amendment limit it, to the trial of criminal cases or
solely to the judicial branch of the government. It extends to every
*Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the-Navy. LL.B.
1929, LL.D. 1962, Washington and Lee University.
The opinions and statements contained herein are the private ones of the
author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting necessarily the views of
the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy or the naval service at
large. The author wishes to acknowledge his thanks to Commander Kurt Hallgarten, USNR, of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for his
assistance in research and in preparation of the footnotes.
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branch and agency of the government: legislative, judicial, executive,
military and administrative,' for the Constitution contemplates that
the life, liberty and property of all persons shall be protected by the
requirements of due process. These requirements serve two general
purposes, first, to insure the integrity of judicial and administrative
processes leading to a decision of a case or the determination of an
2
isssue, and, second, to protect human dignity.
A criminal trial which involves life or liberty requires different
and higher standards than a fact finding inquiry in an administrative
proceeding, even though the administrative board may make a determination which may affect property or status.
The safeguards required in an administrative hearing may therefore vary from those in a criminal trial3 due to the difference in the
nature of the issue presented. The phrase "administrative due process"
'See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 36o U.S. 474, 497 (1959): "This Court has been
zealous to protect these rights [of confrontation and cross-examination] from erosion.
It has spoken out not only in criminal cases ...[citations], but also in all types of
cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny....
[citations]"
".Due process of law' is not confined to judicial proceedings, but extends to
every case which may deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property, whether the
proceeding be judicial, administrative, or executive in its nature." Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 190 (1878).
"... the constitutional guaranty of due process of law, the object of which is
to preserve personal and property rights against the arbitrary action of public officials, applies to administrative as well as judicial proceedings .
42 Am. Jur.,
Public Administrative Law § x6 (1942)2
Cf. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 Yale L.J. 319, 346 (1957). The central problem is found in the integration of private with public welfare according to Bolgar, The Concept of Public
Welfare, 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 44, 6i (1959) and Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to
Due Process?, 3o G. Wash. L. Rev. 399, 427 (1962).
" 'Due Process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect
the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures
which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other
hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Therefore, as a generalization, it can-be said that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which
through the years, have become associated with differing types of proceedings.
Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding,
are all considerations which must be taken into account." Chief Justice Warren
speaking for the Court in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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has also been stated to have a different meaning from "due process." 4
This difference is found in a federal court statement:
"[Wjhere administrative regulations set a higher standard of
procedural due process than that required by the Constitution
or statute, violation amounts to a denial of administrativelyestablished due process of law." 5
Herein, however, administrative due process is treated as due process in administrative proceedings whether prescribed by the Constitution, or required by statutes or regulations, and is not limited to
"administratively-established due process." And this administrative
due process does not lose its character as such because it imposes stricter requirements than the minimum under the Constitution. Dependent
upon its mandatory or discretionary terms, soundly interpreted, a
statute enacted by Congress or a regulation promulgated by an
administrative authority is binding on an administrative agency even
with respect to those rules which require procedural safeguards not
required by ,the Constitution.6
It may be argued that the due process required by the Constitution
is the minimum standard of fairness and that the phrase "due process"
should be reserved for use in relation to the provisions of the Constitution. Such a limitation of definition might be useful in ruling upon
"Meador, Some Thoughts on Federal Courts and Army Regulations, ii Mil. L.
Rev., (DA Pam 27-100-11, 1 Jan. 61) 187, 199 (1961).
5
Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463, 476 (S.D. Calif. 1954).
a'Because the proceedings attendant upon petitioner's dismissal from government service on grounds of national security fell substantially short of the requirements of the applicable departmental regulations, we hold that such dismissal was illegal and of no effect." Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959);
see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in part and dissenting in part: "[f]f
dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure even though generous
beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed.... [citation]. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is
now firmly established and if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural
sword shall perish with that sword.... Id. at 546.
As shown by Meador, note 4 supra, there is little justification in holding regulations as binding the issuing administrative agency only if a statute required the
issuance of the regulation. The agency might change or-cancel -its own regulation,
and this may be easier or more difficult dependent on the statutory background;
but as long as a regulation stands unchanged its terms indicate its binding or
discretionary character. The situation might be quite different where deviation from
a regulation does not affect adversely anyone's life, liberty, property, or other legitimate interests. Thus, upon request of the member concerned the Secretary of the
Navy or delegated authority might ratify an enlistment contract that was entered
into for a period more extensive than authorized by regulation.
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a constitutional principle only if the case cannot be decided otherwise. 7
But in this article administrative "due process" is treated as encompassing the Constitution applied in the administrative area, and the
statutory and regulatory implementations, whether minimum or better.
When Chief Justice Hughes said in a landmark case, "[R]egulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process," 8 he rather rejected the
idea of due process being limited to a historical minimum.
II. MILITARY DUE PROCESS

In addition to the phrase "administrative due process," the term
"military due process" has come into use in recent years. In one of its
earliest decisions, the Court of Military Appeals referred to military
due process as a set of rules to be observed in 'the trial of military offenses by courts-martial and intended to point up "the minimum
standards which are the framework for the concept and which must be
met before the accused can be legally convicted." 9 The court in this
decision, however, denied that the Constitution is the foundation of
the structure saying: "[W]e do not bottom those rights and privileges
on the Constitution. We base them on the laws as enacted by Congress

....

"10 Two years later, Chief Justice Vinson voiced a different

view: "The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation
of his constitutional rights."" Subsequently and after a change in
"Cf., e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936), sylla-

bus No. 14: "In determining whether a legislative rate consists with due process
under the Constitution, the question is whether the legislative action has passed
beyond the lowest limit of the permitted zone of reasonableness into the forbidden
reaches of confiscation...."
sWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). See Miller, note s
supra, at 410.
9
United States v. Clay, x USCMA 74, 77, 1 CMR 74, 77 (1951). The opinion
also contains the following definition of due process: "Generally speaking, due
process means a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement
and protection of private rights."
"Ibid.
"Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). To the same effect, see Shapiro v.
United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 65o, 69 F. Supp. 205, 207 (1947): "It

would seem to

go without saying that these amendments apply as well to military tribunals as to
civil ones." See also United States v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944): "We think
that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in a federal military
court as well as in a federal civil court ... the military law provides its own dis-
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membership, the Court of Military Appeals revised its standpoint and
found it "apparent that the protection of ,the Bill of Rights, except
those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable,
are available to members of our armed forces."'1
With the constitutional foundation well recognized, the term
"military due process" continues to serve a practical purpose in distinguishing the Bill of Rights as applicable to a civil citizen, and the
Bill of Rights as applicable to a serviceman subject to the exclusion
for the serviceman of those protections "which are expressly or by
necessary implication inapplicable."' 13 In addition, the phrase "military
due process" aids in making understandable due process as applicable
to the military with the inclusion of some statutory safeguards beyond those granted by the Constitution. Article 31 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice is a good example.1 4
tinctive procedure to which the members of the armed forces must submit. But the
due process clause guarantees to them that this military procedure will be applied to
them in a fundamentally fair way. In 1956, Mr. Justice Black observed, "As yet it
has not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective
parts of the Constitution apply to military trials." Reid v. Covert, 354 US. 1, 37
(1956).
"United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 430, 29 CMR 244, 246 (196o). The
Jacoby case illustrates a practical consequence of basing military due process in
the first place on the Constitution: The Court construed article 49 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (io USC 849), dealing with depositions, to the effect that
the accused must be afforded the opportunity for confrontation with witnesses
against him under the sixth amendment, i.e., the opportunity to be present with
his counsel at the taking of a deposition on written interrogatories. The Court
overruled contrary previous decisions (United States v. Sutton, 3 USCMA 220, 11
CMR 220 (1953); United States v. Parrish, 7 USCMA 337, 22 CMR 127 (1956) and
modified in effect the Presidential regulations on the subject (E.O. 10214, Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, par. 117b).
"Supra. text to note 12. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 266, 296 (1958) concluded that, subject to necessary modifications,
all rights are available except indictment by grand jury and trial by petty jury,
the right to confrontation, the right to bail and the right to collateral review. One
of the excepted rights, i.e., the right to confrontation should be no longer listed as
excepted because of the Court of Military Appeals' holding in the Jacoby case.
"'The text as set forth in 1o USC is as follows: Section 831. Art. 31. Compulsory
self-incrimination prohibited.
"(a) No person subject to this chapter [i.e., the Uniform Code of Military
Justice] may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the
answer to which may tend to incriminate him.
"(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement
from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him
of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make
any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that
any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by
court-martial.
"(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a state-

6

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX

The fifth amendment protects a person from being compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This is usually
understood to mean that a person may not be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any question, the answer to which may
tend to incriminate him. This principle is restated in article 31(a)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; but article 3 1(b) goes further.
According to this provision, no person has to make any statement
regarding the offense of which ,he is accused or suspected, regardless
of whether the statement would tend to incriminate him, and he must
be informed of his right -to refrain from making any statement. 15 It
has been well said that military due process "begins with the basic
rights and privileges defined in the Constitution" but "does not stop
there" and is "something more, and something different."'16
Another area in which statute and regulation provide for rights
and privileges of servicemen beyond the bare minimum is the right
'to counsel. 17 The Uniform Code of Military Justice prescribes that an
ment or procure evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence
is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
"(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be
received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial." (Aug. io, 1956, ch.
1041, 7oA Stat. 48.)
Another salutary feature of the term "military due process" as applied by the
Court of Military Appeals to a set or list of fundamental rights is the use of the
phrase as a collective title of guarantees, not limited to the due process clause
itself but incorporating therein other safeguards, paralleling similar trends in
Constitutional Law. Cf. Wiener, note 13 supra at 299 and 3o3. .
IsSee United States v. Williams, 2 USCMA 430, 9 GMR 6o (1953); United States
v. Taylor, 5 USCMA 178, 17 CMP. 178 (1954). Applying article 31 and revising in
effect the Presidential regulations on the subject (Manual for Courts-Martial,
cited in note 12, par. 15 ob) of military police work and criminal investigation, the
Court of Military Appeals ruled that a person may not be required to make a
sample of his writing or to utter words for the purpose of voice identification; also
that a person may not be required to give a sample of his urine or to submit to
a blood alcohol test; the Court distinguished blood tests for clinical purposes. Cf.
United States v. Rosato, 3 USCMA 143, 11 CMR 143 (1953); United States v. Eggers,
3 USCMA 191, 11 CMR 191 (1953); United States v. Greer, 3 USCMA 576, 13 CMR
132 (1953); United States v. Jones, 5 USCMA 537, 18 CMR 161 (1955); United States
v. Speight, 5 USCMA 668, 18 CMR 292 (1955); United State v. Brown, 7 USOMA
251, 22 CMR 41 (1956); United States v. Jordan, 7 USCMA 452, 22 CMR 242 (1957);
United States v. Musguire, 9 USCMA 67, 25 CMR 329 (1958); United States v. Morse,
9 USCMA 799, 27 CMR 67 (1958); United States v. McClung, ii USCMA 754, 29
CMR 570 (196o); United States v. Hill, 12 USCMA 9, 30 CMR 9 (196o).
"'Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due
Process, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 225, 232 (1961).
"Under the sixth amendment, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
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accused my select his own civilian counsel, select military counsel of
his choice or have military counsel appointed for him. This right to a
qualified lawyer is provided by statute for general court-martial trials,
for the formal pretrial investigation preceding a general court-martial,
and for appellate review.' 8 An accused before a special court-martial
is also entitled to counsel but the government is not required to furnish
a lawyer unless the trial counsel, i.e., the government's representative
is a lawyer. The right of representation by counsel is granted by law
also to persons designated as a party before a court of inquiry,19 which
is a statutory fact-finding body used by command to develop the facts
and circumstances of an incident or event for the purpose of efficient
administration.20 While the law merely indicates the right of a party
before a court of inquiry to be represented by counsel, implementing
regulations 2' provide for the same three choices granted by statute
in the situations mentioned above 22 though assignment of an officerlawyer is modified. In addition, the same regulations extend the
three choices to proceedings before administrative fact-finding bodies
other than courts of inquiry, i.e., boards of investigation and oneofficer investigations.23
The Court of Military Appeals has been instrumental in clarifying
that an accused or suspect may obtain representation by counsel at
any step of the proceedings against him, including the preliminary
informal investigation by military law enforcement agents.2 4 Denial of
the right will render a confession obtained from the accused in the
course of such preliminary investigation inadmissible as evidence at the
trial.2 5
As observed above, while due process applies to administrative
as well as judicial proceedings, the safeguards necessary for the different types of proceedings may well differ.26 But judicial functions are
11UCMJ article 27, 32, 38, 70 (1o USC 827, 832, 838, 870).
2
UCMJ article 135(c) (1o USC 935(c)).
2'Navy JAG Manual pars. oo, 0202; 32 CFR 719.150, 719a5(a-b).
2

'Navy JAG Manual § o3 o4b; 32 CFR 7 1gi 5 7 (b).
2See text to note 18.
"See note 21 supra; also Navy JAG Manual § ioo6d (32 CFR 75 5 .6id)) for
proceedings to redress injuries to property under UGICJ 139 (io USC 939).For a statutory background of these investigations see R.S. 183 as amended (5 USC 93).
3'United States v. Gunnels, 8 USCMA 130, 23 CMR 354 (1957); United States
v. Rose, 8 USGMA 441, 24 CMR 251 (1957); United States v. Wheaton, 9 USCMA
257, 26 CMR 37 (1958); United States v. Odenweller, 13 USOMA 71, 32 CMR 71
(1962).
:Ibid.
"See text to notes i and 3.
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not limited to courts, and administrative functions are not limited to
administrative agencies. Administrative officials and military officers
may be vested by statute with judicial and quasi-judicial functions
affecting directly the rights of individuals, and their proceedings and
decisions require due process necessary -to safeguard the integrity
and fairness of their judicial actions. The Uniform Code of Military
Justice, for example, refers as follows to the "judicial acts" of the
officers and other officials who appoint ("convene") courts-martial
and review and approve or disapprove the proceedings, findings and
sentences of courts-martial:
"No person subject to this chapter [i.e., the Uniform Code of
Military Justice] may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial ... or the
action of any convening, approving,
or reviewing authority
27
with respect to his judicial acts."

The Court of Military Appeals has dealt several times with the requirement of due process in regard to the actions of reviewing officers,
emphasizing, for instance, that this concept forbids a reviewing officer
approving a court-martial's finding of guilty on the basis of circumstances outside the trial record and delineating the safeguards
required for considering matters outside the trial record in connection
with -the question whether the punishment adjudged by the court
28
should be approved.
In accordance with previous law, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice provides that commanding officers may deal summarily with
minor disciplinary infractions and offenses by imposing disciplinary
"Article 37 (1o USC 837). Article 66 (1o USc 866) provides for boards of review
as intermediate appellate agencies below the Court of Military Appeals. A naval
organization manual explains the status of the boards as follows: "Boards of Review
under the Code are units appointed by the Judge Advocate General in his office
and under his general administrative control, and Board members, although judicially autonomous, are under his military and employment control. ... While organized by and under the general administrative control the Judge Advocate General,
Boards of Review are by law totally independent in the discharge of their judicial
duties." Organization and Functions of Office of the Judge Advocate General, published by Bureau of Naval Personnel, NavPers 1o84 3 -A 1961, page 121.
"sUnited States v. Duffy, 3 USCMA 20, 23, 11 CMR 20, 23 (1953); United States

v. Lanford, 6 USCMA 371, 2o CMR 87 (1955). In Duffy, the court observed: "Without
hesitation, we say that the right of an accused to a review confined to the record
adduced at the trial is safely within the guaranty of military due process of law.
[Citations.] We cannot conceive of a concept more repugnant to elementary justice
than one which would permit appellate reviewing authorities to cast beyond the
limits of the record for 'evidence' with which to sustain a conviction."
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punishments without resort to courts-martial. 29 Referred to as "commanding officer's non-judicial punishment" by the Code, the punitive
measures may be imposed by a commanding officer upon officers and
enlisted members of his command for minor violations of the Code, not
requiring trial by court-martial but requiring more than a nonpunitive
administrative censure or rebuke. The authorized punishments include
such measures as punitive censure, restriction to specified limits for a
period not exceeding two weeks, and (for enlisted members) reduction
to the next inferior grade. Effective February 1, 1963, the range of
authorized punishment was increased, 30 primarily for the reason of
dealing promptly and efficiently with infractions without resort to
court-martial and avoiding the stigma of a federal criminal conviction.31 (Under one of the new provisions, however, a serviceman
except one attached to or embarked in a vessel may demand trial
by court-martial before and instead of submitting to the commanding
officer's disciplinary punishment. By requesting a court-martial, a
serviceman may thus secure the additional safeguards of a criminal
trial.)32
The statutory phrase "commanding officer's nonjudicial punishment" is intended to indicate that the law "provides a means whereby
military commanders deal with minor infractions of discipline without
resorting to criminal law processes" and that the punishment "has
2UCMJ article 15 (io USC 815). For corresponding previous law see Articles of
War article 104 (1o USC 1946 ed. 1576) and Articles for the Government of the Navy
articles 24 and 25 (34 USC 1946 ed. 12oo arts. 24, 25).
OPublic Law 87-648, approved September 7, 1962, amending io USC 815 . For
restriction to specified limits, for example, the maximum was increased to 6o days
dependent, however, on the grade or exercise of general court-martial jurisdiction
of the commanding officer and subject to limitations which may be prescribed by
the President or the Secretary of a military department.
-"Senate Report 1911 of August 23, 1962 (to accompany H.R. 11257), 87 th
Congress, 2d Session; 1962 Cong. News 26o3, 26o5. See the Secretary of the Navy's
ALNAV of September 7, 1962: "The primary objective of the new law is to provide
greater latitude in correcting the offender for his minor breaches of discipline
without the stigma of a court-martial conviction. The increased punishment authority under the new law in the hands of command leaders will be an effective tool for
the promotion of discipline with justice." See also Senate Report i9i1, at 26o6: "As
an example, the Army has indicated that they would expect that about 75 per cent
of their summary courts-martial would be eliminated by the enactment of this
legislation."
1"The Committee [Senate Armed Services Committee] would like to emphasize that only in rare cases would it appear that personnel would demand a trial
by court-martial. It would be expected that nonjudicial punishment would be accepted for most minor infractions." Senate Report 1911 (cited in note 31 at 2604. In
the Army and Air Force there has heretofore existed a right to demand a courtmartial; see Manual, cited in note 12, par. 133a.
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no connection with the military court-martial system."33 The word
"nonjudicial" is therefore used to indicate that no court-martial is
involved but the law leaves no doubt that the use of -this punitive
authority requires impartiality and fairness on the part of the commanding officer, and implementing regulations spell out these requirements in some detail.34 The law itself provides for the additional
safeguard of a right to appeal.3 5
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGE PROCEEDINGS AND SECURITY CLEARANCE

A series of recent decisions of Federal courts deal with the question
whether discharge from Government Service or revocation of security
clearance causing termination of civil employment may be invalid
because of denial of due process in the administrative proceedings
leading to the discharge or revocation. The cases frequently present a
clash of competing interests and the courts' efforts to weigh and strike
a balance. The Government has an interest in eliminating from public
service any person whose continuous employment would not be clearly
consistent with national security. It must also eliminate undesirable
members of the armed services without giving them the highest type
"Senate Report 1911, note 31 supra, at 2604.
"Executive Order 10214, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph 133b (3 CFR 1949-1953 Comp. page 538); Navy JAG Instruction P 5 8oo. 7 ,
Manual of the Judge Advocate General § olold(2), 32 CFR 7 19 o101(d)(2), requiring
that each hearing preceding action under article 15 "shall include the following
elemental requirements:
"(a) Presence of the individual concerned before the officer conducting the
hearing;
"(b) Advice to the individual concerned of the offense or offenses of which he
is suspected;
"(c) Explanation to the individual concerned of his rights under article 31(b)
of the Code;
"(d) Receipt of the oral statements of witnesses against the individual concerned
in his presence or providing the individual concerned with copies of written statements of witnesses against him;
"(e) Availability to the individual concerned of all items of information in the
nature-of physical or documentary evidence for his inspection;
"(f) Full opportunity to the individual concerned to present any matters in
defense, mitigation or extenuation of the suspected offense or offenses."
The regulations have been revised to require, e.g., also advice that the member
may demand trial by court-martial; see text to note 32. The list of requirements
has been incorporated in the Manual for Courts-Martial; E.O.
0io8i of Jan. 29,
1963, 28 F.R. 945, 954.
3UCMJ article i 5 (d) (io USC 815(d)), redesignated 25 (e) (1o USC 825(e)) by
Public Law 87-648.
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of discharge thus preserving the character of an honorable discharge
for those who have truly rendered honorable service. 30
The Government also has an interest in preserving and protecting
sources of confidential information. On the other hand, the individual
has an interest in his reputation and employment opportunities. The
employee may or may not have a right to continue in his present
employment. In any event when these conflicting claims are at stake
he seeks to preserve his job and his employability. Thus the administrative process for determining the issue becomes important. The
decided cases deal with the procedural safeguards, such as hearing,
confrontation and cross-examination which are necessary to obtain a
fair determination. The problem has been stated as "the problem
of reconciling, in the field of administrative action, democratic safeguards and standards of fair play with the effective conduct of government."3 7 It has also been observed that, in any weighing or balancing
process between the conflicting interests, the extent of the injury to
the competing interests "is necessarily of major, and in some instances
38
may be of controlling significance."
An outline of the statutory and regulatory background should precede discussion of the cases. Subject to statutory provisions, the authority of the Government to terminate an enlistment contract or period
of obligated service without ,the consent of the enlisted member is well
recognized. 39 The enlistment contract itself 40 provides for a number
OAs explained in 32 CFR 73o. i and 730.51, there are five types of discharges
for military personnel: (i) Honorable discharges, (2) General discharges under
honorable conditions, (3) Undesirable discharge or discharges under conditions
other than honorable, (4) Bad conduct discharges and (5) Dishonorable discharges
and dismissals. The separations under (1), (2) and (3) are effected by administrative
action and under (4) and (5) by court-martial. A general discharge under honorable
conditions is issued if the military record of the member concerned is not sufficiently
meritorious to warrant the issuance of an honorable discharge. For instance, an
enlisted member who suffered two special court martial sentences during his period
of service will ordinarily receive only a general discharge; cf. 32 CFR 730.53; Bureau
of Naval Personnel Manual article C-7 821( 9 )(b). See also Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d
852 (D.C. Cir. g6i). The basic reasons, and procedures for undesirable discharges
under conditions other than honorable are set forth in 32 CFR 41, with implementing provisions for the naval service in 32 CFR 730.
u'Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure, 26 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 203 (1961), quoting from his earlier report on Administrative Adjudication
in the State of New York 9 (1942).
OBland v. Connally, note 36 supra, at 853.
3,The decision whether a member shall retain his mfitary status or be discharged and the discharge itself, whether honorable or less, are always based on
determinations of material and relevant factors of the military record and involve
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of years of active duty unless the service is -terminated sooner by proper
authority of the Department. Similarly the six or eight year period of
obligated service under the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, as amended, is subject to prior termination when the Government
discharges the member for the purpose of separation (as distinguished
from certain situations such as discharge from enlisted status for the
purpose of commissioned service).41 While the authority of the Government to terminate an enlistment at any time is unquestioned,
questions arise from time to time in regard to safeguards to protect the
members interests where the discharge is less than honorable in character. 42
If the separation is on account of physical disability, the law provides expressly that no member of the Armed Forces, whether officer
or enlisted, may be retired or separated for physical disability without
a full and fair hearing if he demands it. 43 Other statutory safeguards
provide for a double review of any administrative discharge:
(i) A Discharge Review, Board in each Armed Force has authority
to review any discharge or dismissal (excepting only a discharge or
substantive ,and adjective safeguards. 32 CF.
729, 73o-

Parts 41, 42 (28 F.R. 1796), 723, 724,

0The form of the enlistment contract is reproduced in the Bureau of Naval
Personnel Manual, article B- 2310.
u1o USC 651; 50 USC App. 4 5 4 (d)(3). See 32 CFR 5o4(b)(3) (ii): "The military service obligation acquired under provisions of subsection 4(d)( 3) of the
UMT&S Act, as amended is considered terminated upon a discharge for the purpose
of complete separation from military status...."
1ee, e.g., Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Gir. 1961): "He [plaintiff] asserts
that a hearing prior to discharge, under the facts of this case, is a requirement of
due process. The principal constitutional claim, as we understand it, is not that
plaintiff has a right to stay in the Navy until he has served sufficient time to retire
with a pension. Such claim, if asserted, would be frivolous and would provide no
basis for the court's jurisdiction to interfere with the normal operations of the
military services."
3
4 USC 1214; cf. 1o USC 1004. See 32 CFR 725.401: "No member o fthe
naval service shall be separated or retired by reason of physical disability from an
active duty status without a hearing before a physical evaluation board unless such
hearing is waived by the member concerned. No member of the naval service shall
be separated or retired by reason of physical disability from an inactive duty status
without a hearing before a physical evaluation board if such member shall demand

it."
See also 32 CFR 725.1o3(a): "It is the policy of the Navy Department that laws
pertaining to physical disability retirement or separation be administered fairly,
equitably, and with due regard for the interest of both the individual and the

Government. Although these laws should be so administered as to protect the U.S.
Government from assuming unwarranted responsibility for payment of disability
and retirement benefits, reasonable doubt as to the entitlement of a member to such
benefits will be resolved in favor of the individual."
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dismissal by sentence of a general court-martial) upon its own motion
or upon the request of the former member. The review is required
to be based upon the records of the Armed Force concerned and such
other evidence as may be presented to the board. A witness may
present evidence to the board in person or by affidavit. The person
requesting review is allowed to appear before the board in person or
44
by counsel.
(2) Acting through a board of civilians in the executive part of
the department, the Secretary of each military department may correct any military record to correct an error or remove an injustice. 45

Other statutory safeguards apply to members of reserve components:
If a Reserve on active duty is within two years of becoming eligible
for retired or retainer pay, he may not be involuntarily released from
that duty before he becomes eligible for that pay unless he is released
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of a military department (or the Secretary of the Treasury for the Coast Guard) and his
release is approved by the Secretary. 46 This provision applies not only
to separation from the military service by way of discharge but also
to release from active duty without discharge because of the adverse
effect of such release on eligibility for retired pay requiring twenty
years of active duty.
A Reserve who is separated for cause is entitled to a discharge
under honorable conditions unless:
(i) He is discharged under conditions other than honorable under
an approved sentence of a court-martial or under the approved
findings of a board of officers convened by an authority designated
by the Secretary of the military department concerned (or the Secretary of the Treasury for the Coast Guard).
(2) He consents to a discharge under conditions other than honorable with a waiver of proceedings of a court-martial or a board.

(3) He is dropped from the rolls on account of unauthorized absence of three months or more, or a civil court sentences him to con"10 USC 1553; 32 CFR 724.
'5 1o USC 1552. Section 1552(a) provides inter alia that, except when procured

by fraud, a correction under this section is final and conclusive on all officers of
the United States. The implementing regulations provide for a hearing and for the
individual's right to present witnesses in his behalf; 32 CFR 723, 72 3 -4(d) 713-5.
"1o USC 163(d) as added by Public Law 87-65, of September 7, 1962. See
also 10 USC oo6(e).
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finement in a penitentiary or correctional institution and the sentence
4
becomes final. 7
In the case of an officer of a reserve component with at least three
years of commissioned service, the law provides in addition that he
shall not be separated from that component without his consent except under an approved recommendation of a board of officers convened by an authority designated by the Secretary. 48 This provision,
however, does not apply where the officer is dropped from the rolls
(for one of the reasons indicated under (3) of the preceding paragraph)
or dismissed by sentence of a general court-martial, or, in time of war,
by order of the President.
Every board convened for the appointment, promotion, demotion,
involuntary release from active duty, discharge, or retirement of
Reserves shall include an appropriate number of Reserves as prescribed
by -the Secretary of the military department concerned under standards
and policies prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Further, each
member of a board convened for selection for promotion, or for
demotion or discharge of Reserves must be senior in rank to the persons under consideration by the board. 49 All of these safeguards are
cumulative.50
The statutory requirement of approved findings of a board of officers for discharge under conditions other than honorable 5' applies
by its terms only to Reserves. There is no similar statutory requirement for members of the regular components. Implementing regulations of the Secretary of Defense, however, extend to enlisted membexs of regular as well as reserve components. 52 The statute itself
recognizes the difference in administrative discharges, i.e., discharges
under honorable conditions and under conditions other than honorable and does not require proceedings by a board if the discharge is
under honorable conditions. 53 The statute does not specify that the
board of officers considering the separation of an individual under
conditions other than honorable hold a hearing but ,the regulations
of -the Seceretary of Defense 54 require that the individual concerned
'T7o USC 116 3 (b-c).
"8io USC 1163(a).
1 0o USC 266.
'I.e., under io USC 1163, 1553 and 1552.
Glio USC 1163(c).
5232 CFR 41. For additional regulations applying to administrative discharges
from the naval service see 32 CFR 730.
=Another statutory provision recognizes that discharges under honorable conditions fall into two categories: honorable discharges and discharges under honorable conditions; see 1o USC 77 2(d).
"32 GFR 41.8(d)(i).
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be given an opportunity to request or waive, in writing, the following
privileges:
To have his case heard by a board of officers and, subject to
his availability, appear in person before the board.55
To be represented by counsel who, if reasonably available,
should be a lawyer.
To submit statements in his own behalf.
The implementing naval regulations provide also for obtaining military witnesses and the voluntary appearance of civilian witnesses.5 6
If the member considered by the board is a Reserve, the board must
include an appropriate number of Reserve officers. 57 In the case of
a female member, the board must have at least one female officer.
Administrative separation of an enlisted member under conditions other than honorable may only be effected by an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction or higher, including departmental, authority after review of the findings and recommendations of the
board.58
For naval officers, there are several statutory provisions for mandatory separation under proceedings which are not adversary in character and do not involve a hearing. The law provides, for instance,
for separation of officers who fail twice of selection for promotion.59
Boards of officers are charged with the statutory function of considering the records of officers eligible for promotion and to make recommendations regarding those best fitted for promotion. 60 While the
process of selection does not involve any hearing, eligible officers are
privileged by statute to communicate with boards in writing.61 There
is another safeguard provided by regulation to the effect that adverse
or unfavorable matter may not be placed in any officer's record without his knowledge and without giving him an opportunity to make
a statement in regard thereto.6 2 An officer's record is always available
to him for inspection, just as enlisted members have access to their
63
records.
In addition to separation because of failing twice of selection for
promotion, the law provides for separation of naval officers whose
"Confinement by civil authorities renders a member unavailable.
"32GFR
730.15.
7
,See note 49 for statutory basis.
"32 CFR 41.8(d)(2); cf. 32 CFR 730o15(g-j).
ruSee 1o USc 564, 5776, 5903, 6382, 6383, 6389.

'o10USC 5707.
110 USC 5755, 6407.

"U.S. Navy Regulations (issued under io USC 6o1) article 1701.8.
"U.S. Navy Regulations article 17O1.9; 32 CFR 701.1(e).
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record of performance is reported by a selection board or similar
statutory board as unsatisfactory.6 4 Just as reports of selection boards
recommending officers for promotion, a report that an officer's record
of performance is considered unsatisfactory becomes effective only
after review and approval by the President or other cognizant authority.6 5 While the determination of unsatisfactory service is entirely
within the discretion of the board under such standards as it may
establish, supplementary proceedings are possible where fairness requires, e.g., where adverse matter was improperly in the record.
There are several other statutory provisions for the separation of
officers. In some instances, an adversary proceeding with a hearing is
not provided and could serve no useful purpose, for instance, in cases
where separation is based on a statutory maximum age.. 66 In others,
adversary proceedings with hearings are provided for either by law or
67
by implementing regulations.
68
In Harmon v. Brucker, a soldier was separated with a discharge
under conditions other than honorable upon consideration of preinduction activities of the member. The Supreme Court held that
the discharge cannot be sustained because the type of discharge to be
issued is to be determined solely by the soldier's military record. The
Court supported this holding by referring inter alia to the statute
providing for review of discharges by a Discharge Review Board on the
basis of "all available records of" the military department concerned "relating to the person requesting such review (now codified
"410 USC

56o(e), 1166, 57o8(f), 6383, 6384, 6395.
"5o USC 5710.
66io USC 1164, 1255, 1263, 639o, 6391, 6396. See also io USC 64o and 6402 providing for separation of women officers for length of service.
"'See 1o USC 5864 and 5865 (officers found by examining boards not morally
qualified or not professionally qualified); 1o USC 1163, 1165, 6392 (termination of
probationary status within 3 years of appointment); io USC ioo2 (reserve officers
failing to earn minimum number of points required for retention); 1o USC 6410
(separation of reserve officers to provide a steady flow of promotion); io USC 6393,
6397, 64o3, E.O. 10240 (termination of appointments of women officers); 1o USC
680 (opportunity to be heard by a board of officers before a Reserve serving under
an active duty agreement is released from active duty during the period of the agreement.)
For implementing regulations, see, e.g., Navy Department General Order 16,
Regulations Applicable to the Revocation of Commissions of Male Officers; Secretary of the Navy Instruction 19oo.2, Regulations governing discharges... of members of the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve; also 32 CFR 714.1, Regulations governing termination of commissions of women .officers.
Cf. Court-Martial Order 4-1949, 91 discussing the rights implied where opportunity to be heard is granted.
'355 US. 579 (1958).
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in io USC 1553). Harmon v. Brucker does not prohibit military authorities from considering the falsity of an answer of the member in
reply to questions regarding his preinduction or pre-enlistment activities. Discovery of a disloyal or felonious or otherwise discrediting preinduction or pre-enlistment activity may well lead to separation. The
falsity of the answer or concealment may affect the type and character of the separation. 69 Harmon v. Brucker is also relevant for a general holding that judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a Government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers.
In Greene v. McElroy7o an aeronautical engineer's security dearance was revoked on the ground of alleged Communistic associations
and sympathies. He lost his position as general manager of a private
corporation when his clearance was revoked. He then sued for a
judgment declaring that the revocation of his security clearance was
invalid. The Supreme Court held in his favor on the ground that, in
the absence of explicit authorization from the Congress or the President, the Department of Defense was not authorized finally to revoke
his security clearance by means of proceedings in which he was not
afforded opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses on controverted issues of fact. The Court did not reach
or decide the constitutional question whether the President or the
Congress could authorize such proceedings without violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution. The Court indicated its serious
concern in regard to restrictive proceedings without explicit decisions
by the President or Congress within their respective constitutional
powers.
In order to provide for the missing Presidential regulations, the
President, on February 20, 196o, issued Executive Order io865, 71 giving express authority to certain departments, including the Department of Defense, to issue regulations and prescribe requirements for
the safeguarding of classified information within industry. Most importantly in light of the Greene decision, this Executive Order set
forth express authority, under certain clearly defined circumstances
or conditions, to limit opportunity for confrontation and crossexamination. While this may be regarded as remedying proceedings
OSee 32 CFR 42.4 (28 F.R. 1796, Feb. 27, 1963), with additional rules delineating the review of the military record.
,0 6o U.S. 474 (1959)73
'As amended by Executive Order 10909, 50 USC 401 note. Additional legislation
is pending (H.R. 11363, 87 th Congress, 2d Session); cf. House Report 1945, 87 th
Congress, 2d Session. H.R. 951 and 1644, 88th Congress 1st Session.
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under industrial security review regulations, the opinion of the Court
retains great weight because of its general observations that, in the
absence of express statutory or Presidential authorization, administrative -agencies lacked authority to reach final adjudicative determinations affecting substantial rights of an individual by means of procedures which did not provide for opportunity for confrontation and
cross-examination on disputed issues of fact.72 The Department of
Defense regulation implementing Executive Order lO865 affords the
individual whose clearance is under review "an opportunity to crossexamine the person providing the information either orally or by
="Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and
the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual, so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important when the evidence consists of the
testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might
be prejurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice,
or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the
sixth amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy
the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him'. This Court has been
zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal
cases, [Citations] but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory
actions were under scrutiny. [Citations.]
"...[E]ven in the absence of specific delegation, we have no difficulty in finding,
as we do, that the Department of Defense has been authorized to fashion and apply
an industrial clearance system which affords affected persons the safeguards of confrontation and examination.
"...Before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security clearance
cases, a person may be deprived of the right to follow his chosen profession without
full hearing where accusers may be confronted, it must be made clear that the
President or Congress, within their respective constitutional powers, specifically
has decided that the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use. [Citations] Such decisions cannot be assumed by acquiescence or
non-action. [Ciations] They must be made explicitly not only to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually
authorized, [Citation] but also because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws. Without explicit action by lawmakers,
decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default
to administrators who, under our system of government, are not endowed with
authority to decide them.
"Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the
Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected
by the action the traditional safeguards of due process....
"...We decide only that in the absence of explicit authorization from
either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive
petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards
of confrontation and cross examination." 36o U.S. at 496-97, 506, 5o7, and 5o8.
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written interrogatories" except upon certificate of the Secretary of
Defense or certain other agency heads that disclosure of the source of
73
information would be substantially harmful to the national interest.
In all such cases, in accordance with the express requirements of
Executive Order 1o865, a final adverse decision can be reached
only by the Secretary of Defense, based on his personal review of the
case. Between August 1, ig6o, and the end of February 1962, out of a
total of about 8oo cases considered under the 196o program of reviewing industrial personnel access authorizations, it has not been found
necessary to use a certificate in a single case. On the contrary, in every
case during this period in which a personal appearance proceeding
was requested and held, the individual concerned was afforded a full
opportunity of cross-examination of adverse witnesses on issues of fact
placed in controversy.
In 195o Congress passed Public Law 733 (5 USC 22-1) which
authorized the summary suspension without pay of employees of
certain governmental departments in the absolute discretion of the
head of the department "when deemed necessary in the interest of
national security." This law provides for thirty days notice to the
employee when consistent with the national interest, and a written
statement to the employee of the charges against him, with an opportunity for the employee to reply.
The head of a department after review may terminate the employment of a suspended employee "whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security
of the United States." The law provides for reinstatement in the discretion of the head of a department. This law was implemented by
Executive Order 10450. In interpreting the law the Supreme Court in
Cole v. Young, 74 held that the authority in the act was limited to cases

where the employment actually affected the national security. In effect the Court required that the employee should be in a "sensitive"
position, requiring an evaluation of the risk to the national security
that retention of the employee would entail. So it was held that dismissal of a food and drug inspector charged with association with an
allegedly subversive organization was not authorized under the act.
The Court said:
Department of Defense Directive 522o.6, of July 28, ig6o, Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review Regulations, paragraph IIIE2b; 32 CFR 155,
4-,5(b)(2) .

7'351 U-S. 536 (IL956).
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"[It is difficult to justify summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty grounds of employees who are not in
'sensitive' positions and who are thus not situated where they
could bring about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation's
security. In the absence of an immediate threat of harm to the
national security the normal dismissal procedures seem fully
adequate and the justification for summary powers disappears.
Indeed, in view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on
loyalty grounds, the need for procedural safeguards seems even
greater than in other cases, and we will not lightly assume that
Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the absence
of some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of employees handling defense secrets."
In addition to Executive Order 1O865 reference may be had to
Executive Order 1o987, entitled "Agency Systems for Appeals From
Adverse Actions" and prescribing principles of procedure for the reconsideration of administrative decisions to make adverse action
against a Government employee. 75 The military personnel security
regulations concerning industrial personnel of contractors, and Executive Order 1o450 as amended, entitled "Security Requirements for
Government Employment" incorporate the security standard and criteria of Executive Order 10450.76
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,7 7 a case involving security but
really dealing with -the right of a commanding officer to control and
deny access to the installation he commands, involved a cook employed by a business firm operating a cafeteria at the Naval Gun
Factory in Washington, D. C. She lost her job when rnaval authorities
required her to turn in her identification badge on the ground that
she failed to meet the security requirements of the installation. After
75 USC 631 note. See also E.O. 1o988, Employer-Management Cooperation in
the Federal Service (5 USC 631 note). Implementing regulations prescribed by
the Civil Service Commission are set forth in 5 CFR 22 (27 F.R. 4759 of May
19, 1962).

"Department of Defense Directive 521o.9 of June ig, 1956 (superceding an issue
of April 7, 1954) implemented for the naval service by 32 CFR 729, "Navy and
Marine Corps Military Personnel Security Program."
"Military Personnel Security, unlike other Government screening programs,
rests neither on Congressional enactment nor Executive Order but is based on the
inherent disciplinary powers of the military organizations.
"...Following the issuance of Executive Order 1045o establishing the Eisenhower program for all Federal civilian personnel, the Secretary of Defense, on April
7, 1954, reissued, as DOD Directive 5210.9, the previous directives so as to incorporate for military personnel the new security standard and the new security criteria
thus established as national policy for Government civilian personnel ....
Government Security and Loyalty, published by Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., page 31:1.
r7367 U.S. 886 (igi).
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naval authorities at the Gun Factory denied her request for a hearing,
she sued for restoration of her badge. The Supreme Court held that
she was not entitled to relief, as under an explicit Presidential regulation 78 and the historically unquestioned power of a military commander to exclude civilians from the area of his command, the Superintendent of the Naval Gun Factory was authorized to exclude the
cook from the premises on the ground that she failed to meet security
requirements. The summary exclusion was held not to violate the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The Court also pointed out
that security requirements cover many matters other than loyalty,
that the cook was not accused of disloyalty or any intentional wrongdoing and not deprived of employment opportunities anywhere outside the Gun Factory.
In Bland v. Connally,7 9 an inactive naval reservist received a discharge under conditions other than honorable after he was charged
with subversive associations while an inactive member of the Naval Reserve. Bland did not contest the Government's authority to discharge
him but objected to receiving a discharge other than honorable on the
basis of evidence withheld from him and without confrontation with
witnesses against him. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia seemed to follow the line of reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Greene v. McElroy,80 finding -that there is no statute providing for
the procedure used. If there were a statute authorizing the procedure, it
would be scrutinized as to whether it complies with the due process
clause of the Constitution. In -the absence of a statute, the court held
that the administrative agencies should not be regarded as authorized
to withhold the benefits of confrontation and cross-examination from
a member suffering serious disadvantage by receiving an inferior
discharge.
Davis v. Stahrs ' was decided by the same court the same day as the
Bland case. Davis was issued a discharge under conditions other
than honorable on the ground that he failed to disclose subversive
preinduction associations and that he made derogatory statements
about the United States Government while on active duty. At a field
board hearing the Government presented no witnesses. Davis declined
to take the stand or introduce other evidence. After Davis received
an undesirable discharge, he petitioned the Army Discharge Review
Board for an honorable discharge. The Board refused this relief but
"US. Navy Regulations, article o734.
7293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
'036o U.S. 474 (1959).
'293 F.2d 86o (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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concluded Davis should be given a discharge under honorable conditions, a type inferior to an honorable discharge. The report of the
case is not entirely celar as to whether Davis's undesirable discharge
was actually changed to a discharge under honorable conditions.
The court regarded the charge of failure to disclose preinduction
activities as a matter of little weight as the preinduction activities
themselves could not be considered in view of Harmon v. Brucker.
As regards the alleged derogatory remarks about the Government,
the court pointed out that Davis, if court-martialed, would have had
the right of confrontation with and cross-examination of witnesses
against him. The court found there was no authority for refusing
confrontation and issuing an inferior discharge.
In assimilating the alleged failure to disclose subversive associations or giving false answers in regard thereto with the alleged preinduction associations themselves, the opinion of the court is particularly unconvincing. Such false answers are not a preinduction activity,
but a positive part of the enlistment contract.
In Clackum v. United States,8 2 a female member of the Air Force
sued in the Court of Claims for her ipay, asserting that her discharge
under conditions other than honorable was -invalid. She had been discharged on the ground of alleged homosexual matters. She denied the
charges and demanded a court-martial. Instead, she was discharged
without facing her accusers and without disclosure of 'the evidence
against her. The court held that:
"[T]he Air Force had the undoubted right to discharge her
whenever it pleased .... But it is unthinkable thit it should
have the raw power, without respect for even the most elementary notions of due process of law, to load her down with penalties."
The court found the undesirable character of the discharge being of
the very essence and the discharge invalid.
Reede v. Franke8 3 was a suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Navy
from separating a serviceman with general discharge under honorable
conditions. Reed contended that an honorable discharge is a valuable
property right of which he could not be deprived without due process
of law. He asserted that a 'hearing prior to discharge was a requirement
of due process. The court disagreed, pointing out that Congress provided for the review of a discharge in 1o USC 1552 and 1553, that
Section 1553 includes provisions for a full hearing and -that plaintiff
1296 F.2d 226 (Ct. C1. 196o).

297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961).
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has no constitutional right to a hearing prior to discharge: "[D]ue
process requirements are satisfied if the individual is given a hearing
at some point in the administrative proceedings. Those fundamental
requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process in the
proceedings pursuant to the pertinent regulations are met by the
provisions of the statutes above noted." The court regarded as irrelevant the fact that the regulations controlling a discharge on the ground
of unsuitability do not provide for a hearing where -the statutory provisions cited supply this protection.
In Ogden v. Zuckert,8 4 an Air Force officer whose disability rating
was reduced from 40 to lo per cent brought suit against the Secretary
of the Air Force for declaration that he was entitled to be retained on
the retired list rather than being discharged. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held, contrary to the weight of authority,8 5
that failure of the officer to resort to the Board for Correction of Errors under io USC 1552 did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction but that it is discretionary with the District Court either to act
on the case or to require plaintiff first to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
In regard 'to administrative discharges of military personnel, the
foregoing survey of recent cases serves to reaffirm the authority of
the Armed Forces to effect the separation of a member with an honorable discharge without necessarily disclosing evidence against him
and to do so with a lower grade discharge provided the reason is
disclosed and the evidence warrants the lower grade. The foregoing is
merely a generalization of the cases mentioned. It does not fit all types
of situations; nor does it fully reflect the principle of military necessity
on which the Armed Forces may have to rely, dependent on the factual
situation and circumstances involved.
The constitutional clause refers to due process of law in relation
to life, liberty and property, and this has been the basis of the rule that
due process is required under the Constitution where an individual's
rights are at stake as distinguished from a mere privilege. This differentiation alone, however, does not always lead to just conclusions.
A serviceman may have no right against the Government that his
service be continued. Nevertheless, when it comes to the character or
type of discharge, courts may point out that the Government, on
M298

F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

0Cited in the dissenting opinion. See, eg., Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 3o3 U.S.
41, 50 (1938), referring to "the long settled rule of judicial administration that no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."
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the other hand, has no right to stigmatize the individual with an other
than honorable discharge and to harm his reputation and employment
opportunities without allowing him to meet the charges and evidence
against him and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
The most recent security risk case before the Supreme Court was
largely decided on the basis of the distinction between right and privilege: 86 the Court held that the employee of a private business firm has
no right to demand that Government continue permission to enter a restricted military reservation. The Government has the power to terminate permission without a hearing. But the opinion of the Court pointed
out that, if the Government had based the termination on a discriminatory ground, the individual would be protected even if he or she
had only a privilege. Even an absolute power may not be exercised on
a discriminatory basis.
The right-privilege distinction has played an extensive role in
licensing cases; cases involving entry and deportation of aliens;
passports; pardon, parole and probation; Government employment
in general and loyalty and security risk cases in particular. A
leading treatise8 7 observes that Supreme Court decisions are somewhat conflicting in regard to the right and privilege distinction and
that at least two recent Supreme Court cases recognize public civilian
employment as protected by due process.8 8 The same treatise refers
to ,the differentiation between right and privilege as "useful" but as
"too crude for consistent application." 89 For such reasons, the sharp
yes-no distinction between right and privilege is sometimes replaced
by speaking of legitimate interests and by weighing" the legitimate
interests of the opposing parties.
When a statute required that, prior to deciding whether a serviceman should be discharged for cause, the individual be given "an
"Cafeteria Workers v. Mc~lroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The opinion of the Court
qualified the privilege theory by quoting from a licensing case: "One may not
have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government may not prohibit
one from going there unless by means consonant with due process of law." Homer
v. Richardson, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In the Cafeteria case, the opinion of
the Court qualified the privilege theory also by indicating that the weighing of the
interests involved might lead to a different decision where the Government's action
resulted in serious damage to the individual's future employment opportunities.
The Court found there was no such damage in the instant case. (After revocation
of admittance to the Gun Factory, the employer offered the cook another job at
a different cafeteria in the Washington area; the cook declined the offer on the
ground that the location was inconvenient.)
'I1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.20 (1958).
8VWieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Education, 350 US. 551 (x956).
$3 Davis, note 87 supra at 507-08.
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opportunity to be heard. .."90 and when the member concerned was
granted only the opportunity to submit a statement, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy held the discharge invalid.91 His opinion
stated that the term "opportunity to be heard," unless there is a clear
statutory indication to the contrary, implies:
(a) the right to written notice of the time and place for the
hearing, mailed to the individual's address of record at a time
reasonably in advance of the date set for the hearing;
(b) the right of the individual to a full and clear disclosure
of the charges against him, which disclosure should specify the
charges in such detail and with such precision as fully to inform him of what dereliction
of duty or other shortcoming is
2
urged against him;
(c) the right to submit all the evidence and arguments which,
within reason, he deems essential to the proper consideration of
his case; 93
(d) the right to have all pertinent evidence considered and to
have any essential findings supported by the weight of evidence; 94 and
(e) the right to be represented by counsel.
As -the serviceman was not granted any hearing at all, the foregoing list of elements of a hearing was amply sufficient to demonstrate
that the opportunity had been denied. The list, however, is not sufficient for all purposes. In many cases, particularly those where facts
are in controversy, the most essential element of a hearing is the opportunity to meet the opponent's evidence first by being informed of
it, then by means of confrontation and cross-examination and also by
introducing rebuttal evidence. The above list mentions in this respect
only an opportunity for the serviceman to introduce evidence but
does not mention disclosure of the Government's evidence and con95
frontation and cross-examination of the Government's witnesses.
Nor does the list mention opportunity to be present during the opposing party's argument and to reply thereto. 96
A determination of the essential elements of a hearing to insure
'Naval Reserve Act of 1938 § 6, 34 USC 1946 ed. § 853d.
9'CM0 4-1949, 88.
'Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. i (1938).
9Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago 9- St. Louis Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421,
426 (1894).
"The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 (1924).
"The reason for the omission was very simple: in the particular case, the fact
on which the Government relied was not in dispute. The fact was a letter written by
the serviceman to superior authority. The issue rather was whether the letter was
insolent.
"See Davis, note 87 supra, §§ 7.02, 7.07, 7.09.
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fundamental fairness depends therefore on the type of the issue which
is under consideration. Further, the type of the case is also an essential factor in deciding whether a 'hearing is required at all to comply with the concept of due process. This is a question first to be
considered when the law is drafted; if the law is silent, when the implementing regulation is written; and finally, if law and regulation
are silent, in the application of law or regulation. If the matter at
hand is to be decided by way of inspection, -test or examination, a
hearing may not be essential or even practical at all.
The foregoing can be best illustrated by turning to a wide field
of administrative action in which a hearing is only one of several possible methods of reaching a determination: the adjudication of claims.
IV.

CLAIMS PROCEDURES

The following are examples of statutory authority for the ad97
ministrative settlement of claims against the United States:
Personnel claims under 1o USC 2732: claims for not more than
$6,5oo by a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or a member of 'the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps for damage to, or
loss of, personal property incident to his service.
Claims under the Military Claims Act (1o USC 2733): claims for not
more than $5,000 for damage -to, or loss of, real property, personal
property, or personal injury or death caused by a civilian employee of
the Department of Defense or member of the Army, Navy, Air Force
or Marine Corps, acting within the scope of his employment, or otherwise incident to noncombat activities of the Department.
Foreign claims under io USC 2734: claims for not more than
$15,ooo for damage to, or loss of, real or personal property of any
foreign country or inhabitant of a foreign country or for personal
injury to, or death of, any inhabitant of a foreign country, if the
damage occurs outside the United States, or the Territories, Commonwealths or possessions, and is caused by or otherwise incident to
noncombat activities of, the Armed Forces or is caused by a member
thereof or a civilian employee. The statute (1o USC 2734) has been
rendered inapplicable in certain foreign areas by treaties or international agreements which, generally, provide that the foreign government involved shall handle the claim and thereafter the United States
and the foreign government share the expense of any payment made;
17For implementing procedual regulations see, e.g., 32 CFR Parts 75o-755.
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the statutory authorization or recognition may be found in io USC
2734a-b.
Nonscope-of-duty claims under 1o USC 2736 (Pub. L. 87-769, enacted October 9, 1962): claims for not more than $i,ooo, not cognizable under any other provision of law for damage to, or loss of, property or personal injury or death caused by a member of an Armed
Force or a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or Coast
Guard, incident either to the use of a vehicle of the United States
anywhere or any other property of the United States on a Government installation.
Admiralty claims under 1o USc 7621 and 7622: claims for not
more than $i,oooooo for damage caused by a vessel in the naval service or compensation for towage and salvage service rendered a vessel
in the naval service. There is corresponding authority to settle admiralty claims by the United States if the net amount to be received by
the United States is not more than $i,oao,ooo and authority to settle
affirmative salvage claims of the Navy (1o USC 7365, 7 62 3 ).98
Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USC 2671-268o):
claims for not more than $2,500 for damages to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any civilian or military member of the Department while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
One of the basic legal differences under these laws relates to the
question whether there is a requirement of showing negligence or other
culpable action on the part of the Government, as under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, or whether negligence or other tortious conduct is not
a necessary factor for establishing a claim, as under the Military Claims
Act. The various different legal conditions of a claim affect to some
extent the methods employed for establishing a claim. In comparing the two statutes, a manual observes:
ngThe basis of governmental liability is the Suits in Admiralty Act (46 USC
741-752), the Public Vessels Act (46 USC 781-79o) and the Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 USC 13 46(b), 2671-268o). The Suits in Admiralty Act prescribes a procedure for
bringing suit against the United States on a claim which could be asserted in
admiralty if a private person, vessel, cargo or other property were involved.
Wherever a suit in admiralty could be brought against a private party or vessel,
a suit can be brought against the United States in like circumstances. All naval
vessels are public vessels and litigation because of damage caused by such vessels
must proceed under the Public Vessels Act.
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"It is ...very often difficult or impossible to prove that a given
crash occurred through the negligence of the Navy, and the law
is generally interpreted to give as wide an application as possible
to the Military Claims Act since it is less demanding procedurally." 99
If a claim is within the scope of the Military Claims Act, except
that it exceeds the statutory settlement authority of the Secretary of
a military department ($5,000), the Secretary "may pay the the claimant $5,ooo and report the excess to Congress for its consideration"
(1o USC 27 3 3 (d)). In regard hereto, the manual emphasizes the potential for rapid claims settlement of the Military Claims Act within
a period averaging from two to three months. 100
Generally speaking, settlement is founded on a determination of
the legal liability of the United States. The burden is on the claimant
to establish the liability of the United States and the claimant's right
to payment. 10 This does not mean that investigation is delayed until
a claim is filed: "Every service connected incident which may result in
claims against or in favor of the Government shall be promptly and
thoroughly investigated by trained personnel."'1 2 The duties of the
investigating officer in a typical case under the Military Claims Act
include the following:
(i)To conduct investigation of the matter in a fair and
impartial manner.
(2) To secure and consider signed statements from all competent witnesses. Witnesses should be interviewed by the investigating officer at the earliest opportunity. The interests of
the United States may be seriously prejudiced if the investigating officer fails to obtain such statements before witnesses lose
their clear recollection or can be confused by questioning by
persons with adverse interests.
(3)To inspect the property damage and to interview injured persons or their representatives personally.
(4)To ascertain the nature, extent, and amount of damage
and to obtain all pertinent repair bills.
(5)To secure from qualified persons statements concerning
the extent of damage or injury.
(6) To reduce to writing and incorporate into a unified
report all pertinent testimony, exhibits, etc.
w0Organization and Functions of Office of the Judge Advocate General, Published
by Bureau of Naval Personnel, NAVPERS io843-A, g6i, page 84.
M'Id. at 85.
mSee General Accounting Office Manual Policy and Procedures Manual for
Guidance of Federal Agencies § 2o4o, Basis of Claim Settlement.

102 CFR 750.33.
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S(Q) To furnish the proper claim forms to any person who
inquires concerning the procedure for making claim against
the Government as a result of a service-connected incident, and
to advise such person where the claim should be filed
and what
103
substantiating evidence should accompany the claim.
(8) To submit the complete investigative report to his commanding officer as promptly as the circumstances permit; and in
the case of an incident involving any personal injury or property damage estimated to be in excess of $1,ooo, to submit immediately a preliminary report. 04 (In lieu of the report required
above, a short certificate may be sufficient where the claim does
not exceed $ioo.)105
Ordinarily the report of the investigating officer is reviewed by
his commanding officer and then submitted to a superior authorized to
approve the report whereupon an amount recommended therein is
payable provided the claim is approved in the full amount claimed.
It the approved amount is less than the amount claimed, the approved
amount is payable if the claimant agrees to accept the amount as final
settlement.106

The administrative settlement of claims is based on the simple
principle: "The interests of the United States and the Navy are best
served by insuring to the claimant a just disposition of his claim, not
07
by laying a basis for denial which distorts the circumstances."'
'1The enactment of 1o USC 2736 (Pub. L. 87-212 of Sept. 8, 1961) authorizes
also preliminary payment not exceeding $i,ooo in advance of the submission
of a claim cognizable under the Military Claims Act (1o USC 2733) or Foreign
Claims Act (10 USC 2734) to avoid hardship or relieve suffering where the circumstances indicate prima fade a liability of the Government. The preliminary payment
will be deducted from the final amount of settlement.
1"432CFR 750.37.
See 32 CFR 750.38(b).
lc'5See, e.g., 32 CFR 750.39-750.44.
"'Office of the Judge Advocate General-Duties, Organization and Administration, published by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, NAVPERS 10843, 1949, page 84
(now superseded by the publication referred to in note 99 supra). See, to the same
effect, the "Air Force Policy on Claims," as stated in the Air Force Claims Manual
AFM 112-1 of July 2, 1962, paragraph i:
"a. Investigate every previously filed claim or incident which may result in a
claim as soon after the occurrence as possible, to the extent commensurate with
the nature and size of the claim. While the investigation of a minor claim need not
be exhaustive, there should be sufficient evidence in the file to support the disposition made thereof. In the event of a major crash or similar incident involving
an Air Force vehicle which it is anticipated will result in civilian claims against
the Air Force, the claims officer should make every effort to be on the scene of the
accident immediately thereafter. If necessary, he should provide for the injured,
and, to the extent of his authority, generally give emergency aid to those affected
by the crash (see emergency payment provisions in paragraph 72).
"b. Make prompt, just, and reasonable adjudications of all claims.
"c. Pay legitimate claims in the amount found necessary to restore the claimant
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Since the claims authority of the services is entirely in the realm
of settlement and involves no judicial decision or mandatory hearing,
the requirements of due process are not usually involved. It should
be noted, however, that each service has established procedure for
submission of a claim, for substantiating evidence both as to the facts
and as to the amount of damage. These procedures are published in
the Federal Register. The method of handling is substantially uniform, and is the matter of frequent discussion by an inter-service
claims committee composed of senior officers from each service.
While formal hearings are not part of the settlement procedure,
any claims adjudicating authority will consider the arguments in
briefs submitted by claimant's counsel and occasionally in very complex cases an informal hearing will be held if the adjudicating authority desires one.
V. CONTRACTS AND PROCUREMENT

A brief reference might be added to ,the field of government contract and procurement. Procurement contracts of the Department of
Defense contain a disputes clause 0 8 under which any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under the contract shall be decided by
the Contracting Officer and his decision shall be final unless the contractor appeals to the Secretary of the department within thirty days.
The decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative,
i.e., the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in the Department
of Defense (32 CFR 30.1, 27 F.R. 6139) shall be final unless determined
by a court to have been fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or not supported by
substantial evidence. This scope of judicial review is prescribed by
statute, 109 but derives its force from the consent of the parties to the
contract terms. The law provides also that no government contract
shall contain a clause making final the decision of the contracting
officer or other reviewing Government official or board on a question of
law. 1 0 This does not preclude the contracting officer or board of contract appeals from considering any question of law in connection
with, and for the purpose of, their decisions but their decisions are
as nearly as possible to status quo. Bear in mind that it is not the function of
the claims officer to pressure a settlement of legitimate claims for the smallest
amount that the claimant will accept, but to compensate him for the damage
incurred as the result of an Air Force activity."
"932 CFR 7.103-12. See also 41 CFR 1-7.101-12.
"OAct of May 11, 1954 (41 USC 321).
'"Act of May ix, 1954, § 2 (41 USC 322).
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not final as to questions of law so as to preclude review by a court of
such questions."'
The disputes clause provides expressly that, in connection with
any appeal under the clause, the contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of his appeal.
A recent and otherwise rather critical study has found "the success
of, and general public confidence in, the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals" so significant that -this appeals procedure was recommended for adoption by other Government agencies, particularly
because of the fact that decisions of the board are binding on the
Government and are not only advisory as far as the head of the de112
partment or agency is concerned.
VI.

RELATION OF ADMIINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

AcT

As the Administrative Procedure Act"13 may be regarded as a blueprint or pattern of administrative due process, an outline is added to
indicate the principles of the act in relation to administrative proceedings in the Department of Defense. The headings of the following
paragraphs state the principles and the text thereunder indicates the
extent of application or inapplicability dividing the exclusions or
exceptions into two groups: first exceptions which apply to all Government agencies generally and then exceptions which apply specifically
to military and foreign affairs functions.
I. Keeping the public currently informed of organization, procedures and rules (§ 3, 5 USC 1002):
Applicable except (I) generally for (a) functions requiring secrecy in -the public interest and (b) matters relating solely to the internal management of the agency (§ 3, 5 USC 1002) and (2) specifically
for courts-martial, military commissions and military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory
4
(§2(a), 5 USC iooi(a)).1
2. Giving the public an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process (§4, 5 USC 1003):
Excepted: (I) generally any matter relating to agency management
or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts
mNavy

Contract Law § 9.3o (ad ed. 1959).
"'Oulahan, Federal Statutory and Administrative Limitations Upon Atomic
Activities, in Stason, Estep and Pierce, Atoms and the Law 1356 (1959).
n35 USC 1001-1011.

n'See US. v. Aarons and Swann, 31o F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
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and (2) specifically any military, naval and foreign affairs function
of the United States (§4, 5 USC 1oo3).115
3- Uniform standards for adjudicatory proceedings (§ 5, 5 USC
1004):

Applicable only where a statute requires determination on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing.
(I) General exceptions: (a) any matter subject to a subsequent trial
of the law and the facts de novo in any court; (b) the selection or
tenure of an officer or employee of the United States other than hearing examiners appointed under § 11, 5 USC ioio; (c) preceedings in
which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests or elections; etc.
(2) Specific exceptions: military, naval and foreign affairs functions of the United States. -(§ 4, 5 USC 1003.)
4. Judicial review of agency action (§1o, 5 USC 1o):
Applicable except (i) generally so far as (a) statutes preclude judicial
review or (b) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion
(§ 1o, 5 USC lOO9) and (2) specifically for courts-martial, military commissions and military or naval authority exercised in the field in
time of war or in occupied territory § 2(a), 5 USC iOoi (a)).
VII. CONCLUSION
In the course of a recent article on due process, 'the concept is
referred to as evolving, evolutionary, elastic, accordionlike, dynamic
and as a living principle rather than a dead catalogue. 116 Chief Justice
Warren's statement in Hannah v. Larche, quoted earlier in a note, is
to the same effect. 11 7 One of the indications of the wide range of
the concept is the fact that it has been equated with such terms as law
of the land,3 8 government under law and the rule of law, 119 and the
equal-protection-of-the-law concept is considered included in due
process. 12 0 Another illustration of the power and range of the principle
'5The exception for courts-martial, military commissions and military or naval
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory (§ 2(a),
5 USC 1oo1 (a)) listed under paragraphs i and 4 applies also under paragraphs 2
and 3 but is not listed under the latter paragraphs because the exception may be
regarded as encompassed by the more extensive exceptions for military, naval and
foreign affairs functions of the United States listed under paragraph 2 and 3.
nmMiller, note 2 supra.
n7Note 3 supra.
r3athe Constitution, Analysis and Interpretation, Senate Document 17o, 82d
Congress, 2d Session, 845 (1952).

'"Miller, note 2 supra at 4O. Cf. Meador, note 4 supra at 191, 195.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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of due process is the far reaching development of substantive due
process from a restriction on legislators to a positive requirement in
the interest of the common welfare and the equal protection of the
laws. 121
Each officer's first commitment in taking the oath of office is to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and
domestic. 1 22 There is no dichotomy or basic conflict between due
process and efficient government or military necessity. The military
serves to preserve the Constitution, including due process. There may
be, however, and sometimes is a difference of views and interests in
specific cases as to whether the individual's rights and liberties are
restricted unreasonably by the demands of efficient administration of
the Government whose raison d'etre includes the upholding of these
rights and liberties. The weighing of conflicting values and interests
and a rational determination are the very essence of due process. As
has been said, "[t]he test of due process is essentially a test of reason23
ableness."1
With loyalty to the United States, sound judgment and doing always the best we can, the goals of preserving national security, improving national welfare, maintaining efficient administration and the
enjoyment of individual freedoms are compatible; it is not necessary to
24
lose one in advancing the others.
Due process in all procedures is democracy's method of insuring a
legal, fair, just and reasonable result. It works to insure that the individual's rights are protected, but equally preserves the rights of all
the people against the claims of an individual by providing procedures
whereby the relative rights and duties can be fairly decided.

"'See Miller, note 2 supra at 407, 411. Also Senate Document, note 118 supra
at 853, 854.
'R.S. 1757 as amended ( 5 USC 16). Public Law 87-75, of October 5, 1962,
amending io USC 5ox, changed the enlistment oath to contain the same clause.
' i6A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 569(3) citing Santiago v. People of Puerto
Rico, 154 F.2d 811 (ist Cir. 1946).
'-Cf. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 181, 203
(1962).

